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Christine Kellett - Professor of Law, The Pennsylvania State
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I. Introduction
What follows is an edited transcript of the Symposium on "A New
Constitution for Europe (Major Innovations of The Proposed New
European Constitution Treaty)" presented at Penn State Dickinson
School of Law on October 30, 2003. The symposium initially focuses on
the evolution of the European Union, its basic constitutional structure as
set forth in Part I of the draft new European Constitution Treaty, and the
human rights provisions of Part 2 of that document. The issues
addressed are as follows:
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A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE
(Major Innovations of the Proposed New European
Constitution Treaty)
Evolution from the European Coal and Steel Community of 1952 to the
European Union 2002-2003 Constitutional Convention and the 2003
Intergovernmental Conference
Division of Powers between the Union and Member States
-Exclusively delegated Powers (Exclusive Competences in the
European Union)





-Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)
-Internal Matters-Merging the European Community and Justice
and Home Affairs (JHA)









-Types of Legislation and Executive Acts (Legal Instruments)
Protecting Human Rights
Intergovernmental Conference-The Next Step
Addendum - July 6, 2004
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MCCONNAUGHAY: Our first speaker is Takis Tridimas, a long -
standing friend and visiting professor of our law school. Professor
Tridimas, recently the Chief Counsel of the 2003 Greek Presidency of
the European Union Council of Ministers, also is a distinguished
Professor of European Law at the University of Southampton School of
Law in Great Britain. Professor Tridimas is the author of several leading
scholarly works concerning European Community Law.
Our second guest is Mark Tushnet, one of the world's leading
scholars of United States and Comparative Constitutional Law and the
Carmack-Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law at The
Georgetown University Law Center. Professor Tushnet is a former law
clerk to United States Supreme Court Justice Thurgood Marshall and the
author of many leading scholarly articles and books, including a couple
of leading biographies of Justice Marshall. Professor Tushnet also is the
current president of the Association of American Law Schools.
Our third visitor is Jacques Ziller, currently a Professor of Law and
Head of the Law Department of the European University Institute in
Florence. Professor Ziller also is a Professor of Public Law at the
Sorbonne at the University of Paris and a leading scholar of French
Public Law and European Community Law. He is one of Europe's
foremost scholars of Public Administration and the author of several
books and articles on each of these topics. Please join me in welcoming
our distinguished guests.
Our commentators on today's panel include Christine Kellett and
Larry Catd Backer, two of our own professors. Each of them also brings
considerable expertise to questions of Comparative Constitutional Law.
The symposium will commence with some brief remarks by Professor
Del Duca.
DEL DUCA: Thank you Dean. Welcome ladies and gentlemen. It
is a wonderful time to be interested in international and comparative law.
It is certainly a wonderful time to be interested in the host of new
experiments in constitutionalism that are emanating out of Eastern
Europe, Africa, Asia, and all around the world. Constitutional law has
recently assumed a substantially more important role in the world of
comparative law and legal education. For example, we now have at least
two casebooks available in the United States on comparative
constitutional law.' One of these is authored by our colleague who is
1. NORMAN DORSEN ET AL., COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM: CASES AND
MATERIALS (2003); VICKI C. JACKSON & MARK TUSHNET, COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1999).
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with us today, Professor Tushnet. This is a new development in legal
education in the United States. Increasing interest in European Union
constitutional issues is part of this new development.
It is preliminarily worth a moment to look at where we in the United
States were in 1787 and where this exciting European constitutional
experiment is in 2003 and 2004. Our purpose in pursuing this inquiry is
not to focus on a provincial perspective, but rather to emphasize the
importance and magnitude of what is happening in Europe in this area at
this moment of time.
We as a society generally have not really begun to appreciate the
importance of what is here involved. There are, of course, obvious
differences and some similarities to our 1787 experiment. Problems of
vertically dividing power between a central government and its
component units, and horizontally dividing power amongst legislative,
executive and judicial entities in a central government are inherent in any
constitutional structuring. We are familiar with the vertical and
horizontal division of power issues addressed in the 1787 Convention.
Our symposium today will, in part, address the unique manner in which
the current European constitutional revision process is addressing the
matters of vertical and horizontal division of power.
Our discussion today will also note other similarities and substantial
differences between the challenges Europe is currently addressing and
those presented to the 1787 Philadelphia Convention. Contrast the three-
month essentially closed-door 1787 sessions in Philadelphia with the
eighteen-month, essentially transparent deliberations of the Convention
before the draft Constitution was presented to the Intergovernmental
Conference which is currently deliberating what the final text will be of
the Constitution it will submit to the Member States for approval.2 Note
also the substantial differences in the population to be governed by the
two constitutions. Approximately three million people (essentially
sharing a common culture resulting from their status as former English
colonies) were scattered across the Atlantic coast line in 1787. Contrast
the fifteen countries that are currently members of the European Union.
These countries have a population of approximately 350 million people,
11 different languages, different cultures and traditions, and a long
history of individual sovereign nation state status. The current Union of
fifteen states is scheduled to become a Union of twenty-five states
located in western, eastern, northein and southern Europe with a
2. The December 2003 Brussels meeting of the Intergovernmental Conference did
not reach a decision on the final text of the Constitution. The matter will therefore be
before an Intergovernmental Conference that will be under the Presidency of Ireland for
the first six months of 2004, and The Netherlands for the last six months of 2004.
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population of 500 million people and twenty-one different languages.
These differences in language, history, tradition and individual national
identity, etc. cause some skeptics to question whether the proposed new
European Constitution will enter into existence. Others find a basis for
cautious optimism in the successes thus far achieved.
Consider briefly the history of the evolution of Europe in the past
fifty years. Out of the ashes and chaos of World War II came a
generation of politicians, who overnight became statesmen in an
international globalized world. People like Monnet, Schuman, Spaak,
Adenaur and DiGasperi were ordinary politicians turned statesmen who
concluded that new institutions had to be created to make possible
rational and peaceful resolution of economic and political problems that
had driven Europe into three major wars in three generations. They
created marvelous things. They created the Council of Europe-a
talking society yes-but a talking society which despite the lack of any
legislative power nevertheless possessed the capacity to generate a
consensus that produced the European Convention on Human Rights.
Today this Convention involves commitment by forty-five countries
representing over 800 million people to submit themselves to the
jurisdiction (i.e., mandatory jurisdiction) of the European Court of
Human Rights in Strasbourg on issues pertaining to human rights-a
marvelous accomplishment.
Contemporaneously, the notion developed that new economic
institutions were necessary to meet new challenges. The unique genius
of these statesmen and other European leaders and people developing the
institutions was demonstrated by their combination of idealism with a
unique sense of realism and practicality. They did not proclaim a goal of
creating a pervasive economic entity. Instead they very cautiously
surveyed the terrain, and identified a single sector (i.e., coal and steel) for
experimentation in a program to produce some sense of rationality rather
than political and military confrontation in determining how the coal and
steel resources of Europe should be developed and distributed. This
single sector approach through the creation of the European Coal and
Steel Community also provided experience and lessons in cooperative
enterprise amongst the European Member States.
A new level of cooperation emerged in 1957. The incremental
evolution from a single sector to a broad-based economic union
involving all sectors of the economy is characteristic of the general
incremental economic and political evolution of Europe over the past
fifty years. The idea in 1957 was to expand the single sector coal and
steel experiment into a broad-based general economic union. This led to
the European Economic Union consisting of the Benelux countries and
France, Germany, and Italy. In 1957 these countries created a free trade
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area and a customs union to abolish tariffs amongst the Member States
and also create a common tariff as to goods coming into the free trade
area.
We know what happened after that. In 1987 the Single European
Union Act initiated a detailed set of practical steps to establish a single
integrated European Economic Market. Maastricht followed, explicitly
addressing the need for European cooperation in foreign policy and
security matters and justice and home affairs. This was done in the
context of giving the European Union a talking kind of power (not an
actual power) in foreign policy and security affairs and justice and home
affairs. Member States were to meet regularly to talk about foreign
policy, security policy, and justice and home affairs issues, but they were
not ready or willing to surrender sovereignty on these matters.
Subsequently came Amsterdam, Nice, and now we have the
Constitutional Convention and the Intergovernmental Conference.
Colleagues on either side of me will go into detail on these
developments. Note again, that we are not discussing the lot of a few
million people along the Atlantic coast, as was the case in 1787. We are
discussing a union of fifteen Member states already having a population
of 350 million, which in 2004 is expected to have twenty-five Member
States with a population of 500 million people. This is an enormous
experiment in creating governmental institutions. It is unique. It has no
precedent. The much-discussed European Institutions are, in many
respects, unlike the legislative, executive and judicial institutions in the
United States, Europe, or any other place. They are in a class of their
own-created in response to the special needs of a supranational
organization responding to the needs of Nation States and their
populations, who instinctively desire to retain their individual
sovereignty but are also aware that resolution of economic and political
issues rationally and peacefully requires creation of new institutions in
which portions of their sovereignty are shared.
Our speakers will initially focus on Part 1 of the Constitution, which
addresses the first five issues listed on the program-essentially the basic
constitutional structure. They will then address Part 2 of the
Constitution, which pertains to human rights.
Between those two parts we will have some comments by our two
commentators on the discussion that has proceeded up to that point and
we will invite questions, comments, and observations from the audience.
Our first speaker is our distinguished colleague, Takis Tridimas,
who was very actively involved in this whole process in his capacity of
counsel for the Greek Presidency while the drafting was occurring. Let's
welcome our distinguished colleague.
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TRIDIMAS: Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you very much. Let me
first say what an honor it is to be invited to this Conference and what a
great pleasure it is to be back in Carlisle. I would like to thank Dean
McConnaughay and Professor Del Duca for organizing this event so
marvelously. My thanks are also due to all members of the Dickinson
Faculty for making me feel, once more, so welcome.
As Professor Del Duca pointed out, we have come a long way since
1952 when the first steps towards European integration were taken with
the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community. In fact,
there have been more than ten major constitutional revisions, nine of
which have taken place within the last twenty years or so. Since 1980
there have been four new Accession Treaties: Greece acceded to the
Communities in 1981; Spain and Portugal in 1986; Austria, Finland and
Sweden in 1995; and the latest accession, which is the largest, will take
place in May 2004 following the signature of the Treaty of Accession
with ten new States in Athens on 16 April 2003.3 In parallel, the original
treaties were revised by the Single European Act (1986), the Treaty on
European Union (1992), the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997), and the Treaty
of Nice (2001). There is no nation state which has had its constitution
revised so frequently in such a short period of time. Europe is in
political turmoil. This constant need for revisions and adjustments
reflects the quest for optimal structures, procedures, and rules to make
the project of European integration workable and sustainable, but also,
equally importantly, the quest for Union legitimacy.
Before discussing the provisions of the draft Constitution, let me
outline briefly some recent trends in the broader field of EU judicial
protection and governance which, although diverse in their origin, form
part of the wider constitutional framework within which the draft
Constitution has emerged.
The first trend is what can be referred to as formalization, namely, a
tendency to provide for the express declaration and entrenchment of
rights in constitutional texts. This trend began with the Treaty on
European Union, which, for the first time, enshrined respect for
fundamental rights at Treaty level and declared the Union to be founded
on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and
fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.4 It also amended the EC
Treaty by providing express recognition of fundamental constitutional
3. The new States are the following: Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia.
4. See Treaty on European Union, adopted as part of the Treaty of Maastricht
(signed Feb. 7, 1992; effective Nov. 1, 1993), art. 6(1) and (2), OJ. C 224/1 (1992),
[1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 719.
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doctrines, for example, subsidiarity and proportionality.5 Another prime
example is provided by the adoption of the Charter for the Protection of
the Fundamental Rights, which now forms Part II of the draft
Constitution. The draft Constitution itself represents the culmination of
this tendency towards formalization.
The second trend, which is prevalent in the case law of the
European Court of Justice, is a trend towards equivalence. This is to say
that the Court increasingly subjects the Community institutions and the
Member States to the same standards of scrutiny and accountability.
This applies, in particular, to the fields of judicial review and liability in
damages for breach of Community law. The Court, in other words,
increasingly views supra-national and state agencies as being part of the
same administration.
The third trend could be referred to as selective deference. By this,
I mean that in some areas the Court of Justice is content to defer to
choices made at national level, uphold the powers of the Member States
or leave matters to the national courts to decide. But in other areas, the
Court is willing to provide leadership and dictate the results. Risking
over-simplification, one could say that in recent years the Court has been
active and interventionist in the fields of European citizenship, human
rights, and remedies but less so in the field of Community competence.
Let me now take you through some of the provisions of Part I of the
draft Constitution. I will deal, first, with Articles 1 and 2 and then the
provisions pertaining to the division of competence between the Union
and the Member States. As a preliminary point, allow me a
terminological clarification. One of the innovations of the draft
Constitution is that it abolishes the European Community as a separate
entity. It brings the European Union Treaty and the European
Community Treaty under one roof and also abolishes the current three-
pillared structure of the European Union, which comprises the European
Community, the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Police
and Judicial Co-operation in Criminal Matters. The intention is that all
aspects of Union law will be governed by one overarching document,
namely the Constitution.
Article 1(1) of the draft Constitution, headed "Establishment of the
Union," is instrumental in helping us to understand the function and the
nature of the European Union as a supra-national entity. It states as
follows:
Reflecting the will of the citizens and States of Europe to build a
5. See Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (Treaty of Rome),
opened for signature Mar. 25, 1957, art. 5, 261 U.N.T.S. 140 (entered into force Jan. 1,
1958).
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common future, this Constitution establishes the European Union, on
which the Member States confer competences to attain objectives that
they have in common. The Union shall coordinate the policies by
which the Member States aim to achieve these objectives, and shall
exercise in the Community way the competences they confer on it.
Article 1 suggests that Union legitimacy derives from a dual source,
namely the citizens and the States of Europe. Whilst the second source is
indisputable, one may question the extent to which the Union is based
directly on the wishes of the citizens of the Member States. The project
of European integration is primarily an elite-driven process. The
European Community has evolved, expanded and mutated to a supra-
national system of government which rivals the nation-state because, in
the post-war years, successive governments of European States have
remained firm in their belief that, at the very least, it is better to be
members of the Community rather than to remain outside it. This is not
to say that the citizenry has not influenced the process of integration but
to illustrate that the European project has been driven primarily by the
political elite. The draft Constitution provides no exception.
The assertion of Article I that the Constitution establishes the Union
"reflecting the will of the citizens" receives support from the fact that the
national governments are themselves accountable to their electorates.
Approval of the Constitution by the national Parliaments ensures that the
wishes of the citizens are taken into account since the parliamentarians
are themselves elected by the people. This logic is impeccable under the
model of representative democracy but one may question whether it is
appropriate for a document that aspires to the title of a Constitution for
Europe. The claim that the Constitution derives authority from the
people would be much stronger if the Constitution provided that it should
be approved by referendum in each of the Member States. Instead, the
Constitution, which has the form of an international treaty, leaves the
method of its ratification to the "respective constitutional requirements"
of the Member States (Article IV-8(l)). This, it may be argued, denies it
the character of a true constitution.
Another aspect of Article 1 is that it adopts a functional approach
towards the European Union by defining it as an entity that has been
mandated by the Member States to attain common objectives. Implicit in
this statement is the assumption that, at least in relation to certain issues,
the nation state is not the optimal political structure for reaching
decisions. However, while Article 1 recognizes the limitations of the
nation state, it perceives the Union as an agent of, and therefore
subordinate to, the Member States.
Article 1 states that the Union shall exercise "in the Community
way" the competences conferred upon it. This inelegant expression is a
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solecism inserted in the Treaty to avoid the use of the term "federal" to
which some national delegations vehemently objected. It means that the
Union institutions are empowered to act by the means, instruments,
structures, and methodology that have developed over the years in the
Community context and whose distinct feature is that they go much
further than classic intergovernmental forms of co-operation.
Article 2 reflects the values of the Union. It declares that "the Union
is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty,
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights." This
provision encapsulates the spirit of liberal democracy. It provides
ideological continuity with the constitutional traditions of the Member
States and defines what the Union stands for. In doing so, it seeks to
forge a common political identity but also serves as a postulation:
respect for the values enshrined therein becomes a political and legal
imperative both for the Union institutions and the Member States. This
dual character of Article 2 provides a declaration of nascent nationhood
and lays down the underpinnings for the recognition of European
citizenship in subsequent provisions of the Constitution. Article 2 also
defines the Union as "a society of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity
and non-discrimination." This statement, which is reminiscent of
language used by the European Court of Human Rights,6 (envisages a
notion of democracy which extends beyond majoritarianism and
incorporates a broad conception of human rights.
I turn now to examine the provisions on competence. One of the
innovations of the Constitution is that it contains express and detailed
provisions concerning the division of competence between the Union and
the Member States. These dispositions provide, to a good extent, a
restatement of principles laid down in the existing Treaties or elaborated
in the case law of the Court of Justice in an attempt to clarify the law and
enhance legal certainty.
Article 9 recasts with minor amendments the provisions of Article 5
of the European Community Treaty, and lays down the principles of
attribution of competence, subsidiarity, and proportionality. These
principles are well known and I need not refer to them in detail. Suffice
it to say that the division of competence between the Union and the
Member States is governed by two fundamental principles. First, the
presumption of competence lies with the Member States. As stated in
Article 9(2), the Union only has those powers which are given to it
expressly or by implication by the Constitution. Competences not so
conferred upon the Union remain with the nation state. Thus, the
institutions of the Union do not have self-executing powers and, by
6. See, e.g., Smith & Grady v. United Kingdom, 29 Eur. Ct. H.R. 493 (1999).
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default, power lies with the Member States. Secondly, where the Union
has competence, such competence is, as a general rule, shared with the
Member States and not exclusive to the Union; or, to put it differently,
the Union only has exclusive competence where that is stated by the
Constitution. This derives from the nature of Union competence and also
from Article 13(1) to which I will return later.
Article 10(1) provides expressly for the principle of primacy of
Union law. Where there is conflict between Union law and national law,
the former prevails. This is a principle well-established in the case law
of the Court of Justice since the early years of the European Community.
Indeed, one of the most important characteristics in the development of
Community law is the way the Court has progressively expanded the
content of primacy and derived from it remedial implications, including
the right to reparation against the State for breach of Community law.
Article 10(2) further states that Member States must take all
appropriate measures, general or particular, to ensure fulfillment of the
obligations flowing from the Constitution or resulting from the acts of
the Union institutions. This obligation binds all organs of the Member
States, i.e., the legislature, the executive and the judiciary, and is a
specific expression of the general principle of solidarity and co-operation
which is provided for in Article 5(2) of the draft Constitution and
currently found in Article 10 of the European Community Treaty. The
Court of Justice has used the duty of cooperation in conjunction with the
principle of primacy to impose specific duties on national courts to
provide full and effective protection of Community rights and to
colonize, at least to some extent, the law of remedies.
Article 11 of the draft Constitution distinguishes three types of
Union competence, namely exclusive, concurrent, and complementary. I
will examine those in turn.
Under Article 11 (1), where the Union enjoys exclusive competence,
only the Union may legislate and adopt binding acts. The Member States
may do so only if they are empowered by the Union or for the
implementation of acts adopted by the Union. Thus, in case of
exclusivity, Member States may intervene only as agents of the Union.
Such agency may exist for the purposes of implementing Union
obligations into national law or if Union law delegates legislative power
to the Member States. The powers of Member States in this context are
less certain, and possibly wider, than a first reading of Article 11 would
suggest. Thus, Union law may grant delegated powers to the Member
States not only expressly but also by implication. Also, the
implementing powers of the Member States and the discretion of national
authorities may be wide even in areas where the Union enjoys exclusive
competence. An example for this is provided by competition law, in
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relation to which Union competence is exclusive but the enforcement of
which has recently been decentralized and entrusted to national
competition authorities. Further, in exceptional circumstances, the
Member States may be allowed to take action temporarily as "trustees"
for the protection of Union interests, although it appears form the case
law that this remains a rather theoretical possibility.7
Article 12 provides for the first time for a list of exclusive
competences. So far, the founding Treaties have remained silent on this
and it has fallen to the Court to determine, as and when a dispute arises,
whether a specific area falls within the exclusive or shared competence
of the Community. Article 12(1) states that the Union has exclusive
competence to establish the competition rules necessary for the
functioning of the internal market. The scope of exclusivity here is
narrower than it appears. The Union is granted exclusive power to
prescribe the competition rules of the Treaty, i.e., the rules prohibiting
anti-competitive conduct (competition stricto sensu). Exclusivity does
not extend to the rules that are necessary to remove distortions of
competition in the internal market, in relation to which, under Article 13,
the competence of the Union is shared.
Article 12(1) defines the competence of the Union as being
exclusive also in the following fields:
" monetary policy for the countries that have adopted the euro
" common commercial policy (i.e. trade relations between the
Union and third countries)
* customs union
• conservation of marine biological resources.
In relation to these areas, the draft Constitution does not innovate
but provides a restatement of the law and endorses the principles laid
down in the case law of the Court of Justice. The same is true for Article
12(2) which defines exclusivity in the context of external action, namely
the treaty-making power of the Union. It states that the Union has
exclusive competence for the conclusion of an international agreement in
the following cases: where its conclusion is provided for in a legislative
act of the Union; where it is necessary to enable it to exercise its internal
competence; and where it affects an internal Union act.
The detailed consideration of these provisions lies beyond the scope
of this symposium. Suffice it to say that, although the articles of the
Constitution make a noble attempt to increase legal certainty in a
sensitive area, the notion of competence remains elusive, partly because
of its nature and partly because the consequences of exclusivity are
difficult to define in the abstract. In fact, competence is an area where
7. See Case 804/79, Commission v. United Kingdom, 1981 E.C.R. 1045, [1981].
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the Court has taken a less principled approach than other areas and, on
occasion, although it has used the language of exclusivity it has refused
to draw the legal implications which one would expect to flow from it.
I turn now to shared competence. Under Article 11(2), where the
Union and the Member States share competence, both have the power to
legislate and adopt binding rules. The Member States, however, may
exercise their competence to the extent that the Union has not exercised
its own or has decided to cease exercising it. Thus, the exercise by the
Union of its competence has a blocking effect. The Member States may
no longer adopt laws which might affect Union rules or alter their scope.
Article 13 provides for the areas of shared competence. This
enumeration, however, is indicative and not exhaustive since, as I said
earlier, shared competence is the "default mode." This is recognized by
Article 13(1), which states that the Union shares competence with the
Member States where the Constitution confers on it a competence that
does not relate to the areas of exclusive or complementary competence as
defined by the Constitution.
Article 13(2) lists, inter alia, the following areas of shared
competence:
" internal market
" establishment of an area of freedom, security and justice
" agriculture and fisheries, excluding the conservation of marine
biological resources
" energy
" certain aspects of social security
• environment
" consumer protection
It should be noted that the inclusion of the internal market in the
shared rather than the exclusive competence of the Union proved
controversial but was dictated by political considerations. But what does
shared competence mean in this context? Clearly, the Member States
may not individually adopt rules providing for interstate free movement
outside the aegis of the Union. The lack of Union exclusivity however
has, among others, the following legal implication. It means that the
principle of subsidiarity applies in relation to Union harmonization
measures introduced in order to provide for the establishment or the
functioning of the internal market. It may also leave open the possibility
of some Member States pursuing enhanced cooperation in this field
under Article 43 of the proposed Constitution, although this is an area
marred with difficulties of interpretation.
The third type of Union competence recognized by the draft
Constitution is complementary competence. Under Article 11(5), this
means that the Union may carry out actions to support, coordinate or
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supplement the actions of the Member States "without thereby
superseding their competence in these areas." Under Article 16(2),
complementarity exists in the following areas: industry; protection and
improvement of human health; education; vocational training; youth and
sport; culture; and civil protection. The specific powers of the Union in
those areas are laid down in Chapter V of Part III of the Constitution.
The Union may adopt binding acts, to the extent provided for in Chapter
V, but such acts may not entail the harmonization of national laws
(Article 16(3)).
The complementary nature of Union competence circumscribes the
scope of Union powers ratione materiae. It means, in other words, that
the Union may only adopt measures which support national measures in
the respective fields as provided for in the provisions of Chapter V of
Part III. These are areas where policy making power rests primarily with
the nation state and the Union may only play the role of the assistant,
coordinator, or mentor. It will be noted, however, that this subordinate
role of the Union is subject to countervailing forces. First, where the
Union validly introduces legislation in those areas this legislation binds
the Member States, which may no longer introduce measures that affect
or alter the Union laws. Secondly, Union presence in these areas may
potentially be enhanced by a "spill-over effect," although so far there is
little evidence of this happening.
Finally, Article 17 of the draft Constitution, termed "flexibility
clause," recasts in more detailed terms the provision of Article 308 of the
European Community Treaty. It bestows the Council with open-ended
residual authority to adopt measures for the attainment of the Community
objectives. Article 17(1) states as follows:
If action by the Union should prove necessary within the framework
of the policies defined in Part III to attain one of the objectives set by
the Constitution, and the Constitution has not provided the necessary
powers, the Council of Ministers, acting unanimously on a proposal
from the Commission and after obtaining the consent of the European
Parliament, shall take the appropriate measures.
In drafting terms, Article 17(1) is an improvement over the current
provision of Article 308 of the Treaty. It differs from Article 308 in the
following respects: It omits the proviso that the necessity of Union
action must have emerged "in the course of the operation of the common
market." This proviso, in any event, has not been attributed much legal
significance by the Court of Justice. Also, it makes clear that the Union
is vested with residual law making power only within the framework of
the policies defined in Part III of the draft Constitution. This endorses
the case law of the European Court of Justice, according to which Article
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308 "cannot serve as a basis for widening the scope of Community
powers beyond the general framework created by the provisions of the
Treaty as a whole and, in particular, by those which define the tasks and
the activities of the Community.' '8 Finally, Article 17(1) requires the
consent of the European Parliament whereas Article 308, as it currently
stands, requires only its consultation.
In addition to the tripartite classification of exclusive, shared, and
complementary competence, the draft Constitution also provides for
Union competence in further areas. Thus, the Union has competence to
define and implement a common foreign and security policy (CFSP)
under Article 11(5). Also, the Union is bestowed with competence to
promote and coordinate the economic and employment policies of the
Member States under Article 11(4). The detailed examination of these
areas falls beyond the scope of this symposium. Suffice it to mention
that, under Article 15 of the draft Constitution, the Union's competence
on the CFSP covers all areas of foreign policy and all questions relating
to the Union's security, including the progressive framing of a common
defense policy. Under Article 15(2), the Member States are required to
actively and unreservedly support the CFSP in a spirit of loyalty and
mutual solidarity and comply with the acts adopted by the Union in this
area. One of the many questions raised in this context is whether this
provision may be justiciable thus giving to the Commission the power to
bring proceedings against a Member State for failure to comply with the
duty of solidarity.
Overall, the provisions of the draft Constitution on competence
should be viewed in a positive light. They seek primarily to restate and
clarify rather than to reform. Although they give rise to a number of
interpretational difficulties, only some of which I was able to highlight in
this seminar, and leave a number of matters undecided, they are an
improvement over the current position of the EC Treaty which contains
precious little about competence. I would therefore prefer to view the
glass, on this occasion, as half full rather than half empty. By way of
conclusion, it may be remarked that competence remains, by nature, an
elusive concept. What matters is not so much the general provisions of
the draft Constitutions but the specific dispositions of Part III, which
provide the legal basis for Union action in specific fields, prescribe the
scope and form of such action, and the procedures for its adoption, and
the Court of Justice which remains the final arbiter.
DEL DUCA: Thank you very much for those very enlightened
8. See Opinion 2/94, Accession by the Community to the European Human Rights
Convention, 1996 ECR 1-1759, 30, [1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 265 (1996).
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remarks. We might note at this juncture some differences in terminology
from one legal system to another.
The references to "competence," "exclusive competence," and
"shared competence" in the European Union context are essentially
references to "delegated powers," "exclusive delegated powers," and
"concurrently delegated powers" in the lexicon of our United States
Constitutional system. Under Article I, Section 8 of the United States
Constitution, Congress is given "delegated powers." Some of those
powers are "exclusively" delegated, and some are "concurrently"
delegated. For example, the power to declare war is said to be delegated
because it is delegated to the Federal Congress by Article I, Section 8. It
is also said to be "exclusively delegated" because it is prohibited to the
states by Article I, Section 10. The power to regulate interstate
commerce is "concurrently delegated" because while it is delegated to
the Federal Congress by Article I, Section 8, it is not prohibited to the
states by Article I, Section 10.
The new European Draft Constitution lists in one section "exclusive
competences" (i.e. "exclusively delegated powers") and in another
section "shared competences" (i.e., "concurrently delegated powers").
This compartmentalization of separate lists of the two types of delegated
competences is more direct and simpler than our two step process of
utilizing a general comprehensive list of delegated powers in Article I,
Section 8 followed by Article I, Section 10, which prohibits states from
exercising certain powers listed in Article I, Section 8.
In summary, in the United States Constitution we have put
exclusive and concurrently delegated powers all together in Article I
Section 8. To determine which are "exclusive" and which are
"concurrent," we have to revert to Article I, Section 10 which lists
powers denied to the states.
Let's welcome our next speaker Jacques Ziller.
ZILLER: Thank you, first to The Dickinson Law School for the
invitation to speak. Thank you to the audience for attending this session
and being interested in the European Union and thank you Professor Del
Duca for starting your remarks with 1787 because this allows me, being
French, to start with 1789, two years later. Article 16 of the Declaration
of Human Rights and the Rights of the Citizen says, (the French is much
better than my rough English translation): "Any society in which rights
are not guaranteed and the separation of powers is not being established
has no constitution." This is one of the ways of looking at the new
European Constitution.
What I want to address is the question of whether the new European
Constitution contributes to a better establishment of separation of
2004]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
powers. I consider at this time the horizontal division of power between
branches of the central government and not the question of vertical
division of power between the central government and its component
parts. I submit that with the new European Constitution there is a better
separation of powers than we had previously. With the new European
Constitution, we now have a clear separation between legislative power
and executive power.
To understand this matter, one must appreciate what the Treaty of
Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, the
Treaty of Rome establishing the European Economic Community in
1957 and the Maastricht Treaty establishing the European Union in 1992
were trying to set up. You have on one side, as in any Constitution,
different institutions that participate in the functions of government. In
the United States the only function that is really independent from the
others is the judiciary. Legislative and executive functions operate
through different elements of checks and balances. Different procedures
are shared to a certain extent.
What we did not have in the earlier European framework was a
clear idea of what is legislation and what is not legislation (e.g. executive
decisions). What we had was something which in 1951-57 was very
useful for the limited purposes of the European Economic Community
(EEC), namely a list of instruments which were differentiated according
to the impact they had on member states-i.e., regulations, directives,
decisions, recommendations, and opinions (Article 189). This was all
very fine at the time, but it is not satisfactory today for two reasons.
First the function of the different instruments is not clear to the
citizens in Europe or elsewhere. It is not what we are accustomed to. It
is not the familiar terminology we are accustomed to like bills, Acts of
the Congress, or Acts of Parliament, "laws" etc.
The other reason is that during the past fifty years, several reforms
in the treaties have occurred. In addition, the Community institutions
have also developed new practices. For instance in 1957, we had a very
clear list of five, and only five, possible types of instruments that could
be utilized. Today however, (depending on how you count them) you
can find at least fifteen or even twenty-five different types of
instruments. This is very confusing. In addition, the current names are
confusing. For example, what is called a "regulation" should be called a
"law." A "directive," as literally understood is a legally binding
instrument. There are also legal problems as to the impact of the
different types of instruments. Trying to provide clarification in the
types of instruments the institutions are authorized to utilize was thus one
of the main tasks of the European Convention.
Article 32 of the draft Constitution is accordingly both a
[Vol. 23:1
SYMPOSIUM ON A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE
consolidation of the present system utilizing new names and
consequently a more understandable system of authorized instruments.
Article 32, (entitled "The Legal Acts of the Union"), is only one part of
this exercise in clarification. The English version is not very good,
because the whole vocabulary of European Community law was
developed at the time when Britain was not part of the Community. The
vocabulary is therefore based on French, Italian, German and to a small
extent, Dutch concepts. For example, United States scholars are not
accustomed to speaking of "competences" but of "powers." Our British
colleagues nevertheless, are speaking about "competence" (a French
term).
What are the "instruments" authorized by Article 32 of the text of
the proposed new European Constitution? We will have "European
laws," "European Framework laws," "European regulations," "European
decisions," "recommendations," and "opinions." These are named first
in Article 32, and addressed in the following articles which provide a
little more detail. The main idea is to replace an "EC" specific
vocabulary with something that is more familiar: "Directive,"
"regulation," and "recommendations" are replaced by "Laws." The
British tradition would call them Acts of Parliament. The new
terminology authorizes legislation called "laws," and other acts called
"regulations" or "decisions." You now have "instruments" that are the
product of the legislative function, and "instruments" that are the product
of the executive function.
This is a major step forward because it is accompanied with a
change in the procedures. I would like next to talk about exercising
competence, (i.e. powers), granted to the Union. "The Union shall use
legal instruments in accordance with the provisions of Part 111." 9 Part III
at Article 111-302 provides for what is called the "ordinary legislative
procedure."
If you were working with the present European
Community/European Union treaties the best way to get a tremendous
headache would be to try to understand and then try to explain the
present decision making procedure. Article 111-302 of the draft
Constitution is far more simple. It is similar to what you have in various
constitutional systems. There is a provision for a single reading. The
whole process stops if both "houses" (i.e., The European Parliament and
the Council'0) agree. You do not need to go further. They have agreed.
9. Article 32.
10. The present Treaties use "Council" as an abbreviation for Council of the
European Union, which means the "Council Ministers" to be distinguished from the
"European Council." The Council of Ministers is composed of members of national
governments having the status of a minister.
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If they do not both agree immediately you will have a second
reading. This is followed by a conciliation procedure between the two.
This conciliation procedure is something which you do not know in the
United States between the two Houses of Congress. It is also unknown
in Italy between the two houses of Parliament which are on equal
footing. However, it is known in most European countries, where the
two Houses of Parliament are not on an equal footing, but where a
conciliation between them is being sought. If needed, there is a third
reading.
Without going into detail, I note that the important step forward is
that in the draft Constitution, the European Parliament is on equal footing
with the Council of Ministers. Nowadays, under the present treaties, this
is not yet the case. At present the European Parliament has far less
powers than the Council of Ministers. There are even still a few
instances where the Parliament only has the ability to give an advisory
opinion.
Now what is specific and remains so in the European Union, is that
both the Parliament and the Council can only adopt legislation if the
European Commission has put forward a proposal. This procedure is not
changing with the draft Constitution, because it is particularly well
adapted to the system of the Union and it is one of the ways of
guaranteeing the vertical division of powers. Nevertheless in one area
the Commission does not have this monopoly of proposing legislation.
In the Area of Freedom and Security, which is about police and justice
affairs, it is possible to adopt legislation upon initiative of a government
of a Member State.
Then we have another aspect, which is a tremendous change
initiated by the draft Constitution. Apart from a very limited number of
cases, we will have one and the same procedure for adopting European
Union legislation. In the former system we had a differentiation along
the so-called "pillars"-not the one Takis Tridimas was alluding to, but a
horrible system invented with the Maastricht Treaty which was very
confusing. The pillar structure is being suppressed in the draft
Constitution. This is a fundamental change which leads to a number of
other changes.
In order to have the full picture one should also go to the end of the
draft Constitution and look at two so-called "Protocols." There is one
Protocol "[o]n the Role of National Parliaments in the European Union"
and another Protocol "[o]n the Application of the Principles Subsidiary
and Proportionality." The important point here is that those two
Protocols have as their purpose and will have the effect of bringing
National Parliaments into the legislative procedure at the European level
to a small but nevertheless important extent. This is something which
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you do not have in the United States, especially since Senators are now
directly elected and not any longer representatives of state legislatures. It
is something Germany knows in its European version of federalism. In
Germany there is some participation on the state level in legislation
generated at the federal level.
What are the consequences of this horizontal separation of power
from the perspective of the institutions? The first consequence is that the
European Parliament is gaining an enormous amount of power, perhaps
not quantitatively but certainly politically and symbolically. It is
becoming a real co-legislator as if we had two Houses (i.e., the European
Parliament and the Council). This impression is reinforced if we look at
budgetary powers where the changes give far more power to the
European Parliament.
There is hardly any change in the powers of the European
Commission. This is quite logical because the European Commission is
still a composite institution, which participates in legislating through
proposing drafts (having a monopoly of proposing legislation) and also
has important executive powers. The draft Constitution gives more
executive power to the Commission than it has at present. The
Commission, in a sense, participates also in the exercise of the judicial
function, because it functions like a kind of attorney general of the
European Union.
The draft Constitution does not say a lot about the European Court
of Justice, but what is said is very important. Article 111-270, at first
glance, reproduces the present text of the European Community treaty
apparently with a very minor change. However, if you read further there
is an important change. The change is in the difference in "standing"
conditions based on whether one wants to review the (lets call it)
"constitutionality" of the European Law or whether the Court is
reviewing regulations, in which case the standing conditions are
broadened.
As far as the Council of Ministers is concerned, what is interesting
is that there is an idea of transforming quite clearly the Council into a
double-headed machinery. The first part makes the distinction in Article
23 between different "Formations" of the Council of Ministers, a French
word that does not mean anything in English and should have been better
translated. "Formation" in this context is intended to mean the
"Component" Councils of the Council-the idea is that we have one
institution, the Council of Ministers with different operating components.
What the Constitution further proposes is to have one component of the
Council of Ministers which would be the "Legislative Council" and
others that would address particular fields as an executive function or as
a more general function of monitoring. However, Foreign Ministers of
2004]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
Member States dislike this idea and will probably suppress the
"Legislative Council."
The idea is that the Council meet privately when it meets as a
particular Component Council and meet publicly like any House of
Parliament when it acts as a legislature. In Article 23 ("Formations of
the Council of Ministers"), there is a clause requiring transparency and
this will certainly remain. So when the Council legislates, it legislates
publicly: it has a procedure like the legislative procedure we know in
state constitutions. On the other hand, when the Council is acting as an
executive institution it meets behind closed doors like the executive in all
our democracies. You know the results of the meeting, but you are not
supposed to know the detailed discussion between the President and
Secretaries, or in Europe between the Prime Minister and ministers. This
is something which is not fully stated but which is also a result of the
separation between legislative and executive functions.
In conclusion, I note that there are a lot of other things in the draft
Constitution, which could be linked to this subject. However, at this
time I will note that if you go beyond the idea of separation between
legislative and executive function there is a lot of institutional
engineering in this Constitution. We will not spend very much time on
this for the simple reason that is what the press is getting excited about.
How many Commissioners should we have, should there be one for each
Member State or not? I think it is very important from a symbolic point
of view. The Commission is supposed to represent general European
interest and not the Member States-and that is why I am one of the
people who think its wrong to argue that there should be one
Commissioner for each Member State. But that is really an issue which,
in a sense, is secondary because it might change over time.
Also, there is institutional engineering which the press has reported.
I think that it is indeed very important to have a permanent President (the
English text says "Chair" but this is a rather clumsy formulation). The
President of the European Council11 is something new, which is not
linked to the separation of powers, but which is certainly worthwhile
discussing. Whether he has a high profile function (like the President of
the United States) or a low profile function (like the German or the
Italian President for instance) is another story, which only the future will
tell us.
There are also a lot of other things in the draft Constitution. For
example, there is a very mysterious formula about the future composition
11. Articles 20 and 21, as distinguished from the Council of Ministers. The
European Council is composed of the top executive branches in Member States, i.e.,
Prime ministers and-for France-the President.
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of the Parliament, saying that it should be "degressively proportional."
The advantage is that nobody knows what "degressively proportional"
means. Mathematicians say that it should not be "degressively" but
"regressively" proportional, but I leave that to the specialists of
institutional engineering. I think these comments address the most
important matters relating to the institutional side of the draft
Constitution.
DEL DUCA: Takis, you may wish to make a few comments
regarding the Commission, Council, Parliament, and the European Court
of Justice in the context of how they relate to our three branches of
government? The two systems are not identical by any means.
TRIDIMAS: There are four institutions, the Council of Ministers,
The Commission, The European Parliament, and the European Court of
Justice. Under the proposed constitution the pillars are fused and have
become a single entity under the name European Union. In addition to
the four institutions I have mentioned, there is also the European
Council. The European Council is a political organ of the European
Union. It is composed of the Heads of Government of the Member
States.
The Council of Ministers changes formation depending on the topic
that is being discussed. It has one representative at the cabinet level for
each Member State. When it discusses agriculture it is the national
minister of agriculture that takes part in the discussion. When it
discusses environment it is the national minister of environment etc. So
it has various formations (i.e. components). The General Affairs
Council, as things currently stand, is made up of the foreign ministers of
the Member States.
The Commission, on the other hand, can best be characterized as the
executive of the European Union. The Commission is independent of
national interest. Each Member State currently has a Commissioner. As
you know we have fifteen Member States and the current law is that the
big Member States have two Commissioners each, and the small
Member States have one Commissioner each. The big Member States
are the United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, and Spain. The tricky
thing is that you are now going to have twenty-five Member States. It
has been said that a Commission composed of twenty-five members
would be an unworkable institution. The proposed Constitution devises
a rotation system under which all Member States do not have a
Commissioner at the same time. There are currently negotiations going
on about this. The smaller Member States think they should always be
allowed to have a Commissioner as a way of protecting their national
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interest. The precise formation and composition of the Commission is
one of the issues currently being discussed in the Intergovernmental
Conference. We shall have to wait to see what emerges.
The European Parliament as Jacques explained so well has now
been elevated to a co-legislative status with the Council. One of the
characteristics of the successive Treaty amendments throughout the last
20 years has been a very gradual increase in the powers of the European
Parliament. The European Parliament has now developed into a
democratic body which exercises, together with national Parliaments,
control over the administration of the Commission.
There is also a new post created by the proposed Constitution,
which is found in Article 27. This is the Union Minister of Foreign
Affairs. The function of this person is to develop the common foreign
and security policy by receiving instructions from the Council of
Ministers. But Article 27 states that the Minister of Foreign Affairs will
also be a member of the Commission. I can not see how this .is going to
work in practice. It seems to me that it runs counter to the separation of
powers. Inevitably, the incumbent will find himself or herself in conflict
of interest situations. There may be cases where the Commission feels
that the Council of Ministers does not do enough to promote common
foreign and security policy. I cannot see how the same person can wear
two hats at the same time and yet avoid conflict of interest. Let us see
again how this is going to develop. I am just picking up on a couple of
points, I was not intending to dwell.
DEL DUCA: Well, Jacques has the floor again.
ZILLER: I would just like to add one comment, I fully share Takis
Tridimas' idea on competence. One of the most important things is what
is not being said in Article 10. I share with him the view that it is a good
thing that it does not say who has ultimate legitimacy.
In order to understand what changes, because there is a change with
the European Constitution, you have to look at Article 59 dealing with
voluntary withdrawal. We visited Gettysburg yesterday. The symbolism
of Gettysburg is obvious in this context. The big difference between
Europe and the United States is that we have in the draft Constitution a
clause on voluntary withdrawal from the Union. This is a tremendous
innovation in the European Constitution because it is solving a question
which we, as academics have disputed. There is one version whereby if
you apply international law, withdrawal is possible but if you apply
Union law, withdrawal is not possible.
This is very important because we provide a solution to a question
which (let's forget about Gettysburg) the Canadians are asking every ten
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years, and which the Supreme Court of Canada has had to answer. Is it
possible or not to withdraw? That is very important because if a member
feels it is possible to withdraw, it also means that it cannot lose its
competences forever. If it is losing its competences to the benefit of the
Union it is only temporary. This temporary nature might last for the
whole life of the Union, or simply, if one day a member is not happy
with what the Union does, it withdraws. This is an important change
because it is stating something which was unclear before.
DEL DUCA: Before we leave this subject I would like to look at
these five institutions from a comparative perspective. I ask myself, how
does the system differ from our traditional United States system? In the
United States system we think in terms of the President, Congress, and
judiciary while on the European Union side, Parliament, European
Council, Commission, Council of Ministers, and Court of Justice. It
does not work out that simplistically in the complicated European Union
system because of the carefully measured surrender of sovereignty by
Member States to the Union, and the interplay of the dynamics of
assertions of power by the various institutions.
Look at the Commission (fifteen members at the present time, one
from each Member State, potentially twenty-five when the Union
grows). We are looking at fifteen people, who under the terms of both
the existing and future Constitutions, owe their loyalty to the Union, not
to the country from which they come. That is very clear, and these
fifteen people (under the present system and under the new system) will
have the power to initiate legislation. They have this exclusive power
except for the one situation that our distinguished colleagues refer to.
All legislation must be initiated by this fifteen person group.
This is legislative power. However, the same fifteen person
Commission is essentially the executive branch in that it has the power to
bring proceedings in the European Court of Justice to enforce the
requirements of the Treaty and Community legislation. We do not have
that mixture in the United States system. There are reasons for this.
Consider the nature of the allocation of power in this Union amongst
sovereign nations that are surrendering a modicum, measured amount of
sovereignty. In this context, look at the Council of Ministers which up
until now has essentially been the legislative body. I should say
"legislative bodies" because of the references to "formation" of Councils
(we translated "formation" in this context to "component" Councils of
the Council of Ministers). Here is how the Council of Ministers works.
Each country appoints one person to the Council of Ministers. The
loyalty of the appointees is not to the Union, but to the country that
appoints. Legislation, up until now, was essentially adopted by the
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Council of Ministers, with the Parliament essentially having an advisory
function and limited operational powers. It is a complicated process, but
the Council is essentially where the legislation was adopted and not in
the popularly elected Parliament which has close to 700 members.
Another factor that I think has to be explicitly stated here is that the
European Union system does not have one Council. Instead, it has
component or so called "formation" Councils. If the legislation the
Commission has proposed has to deal with agriculture there are fifteen
agricultural specialists (one from each country) that decide whether to
adopt or not to adopt the legislative proposal. If it is banking, fisheries,
if it is consumer protection, if it products liability, etc. there are, in each
instance, fifteen different member Councils for each area. These
Councils can work simultaneously. They do work simultaneously. It
always was a puzzle to me how the massive amounts of legislation that
come out of the European Community could be accomplished. But this
is one of the features of the system that makes itpossible.
Now, on the matter of the Parliament: In 1957 it wasn't even
referred to as a Parliament. It was referred to as an Assembly, and that
language remained until 1987 when the Single European Act was
adopted. The word "Parliament" was used there for the first time. That
was no accident. There was no intention on the part of sovereign nation-
Member States to surrender law-making power to a Parliament elected
popularly from particular districts. That was a degree of surrender of
sovereignty that they were not willing to make. It is measured amounts
of sovereignty that have been surrendered, although an increasingly
greater amount of sovereignty over a fifty year period. The Parliament
very painfully evolved from a group of people who were elected but
were essentially to give advice on the propriety, and desirability of
legislation, but not to vote on it. The new treaty now, as Jacques so well
described here, will, for the first time, make this Parliament something
like a real Parliament. But, although the concurrence now of the
Parliament to adopt a legislative act is needed, they certainly do not have
the first vote on pendency legislation.
Such fundamental differences make the European Union system
unlike the system of any European, United States, or any other country.
It picks and chooses and creates new institutions in devising power very
intentionally and very carefully to solve the schizophrenia of nations
recognizing the need to surrender power in order to create an institution
that can peacefully create rules that will solve economic and political
problems, yet instinctively wanting to retain their sovereignty.
Are there other comments on this point?
Well, then we will move on to the next part of the program and give
our distinguished commentators on my left, my colleagues Professor
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Chris Kellett and Larry Backer a chance to make comments.
KELLETT: I was thrilled to be part of this and to hear these
comments. Takis has pointed out very carefully that the pillars and the
reasons for this new Constitution are to bring peace and prosperity to the
continent of Europe and the Member States of the European Union.
Clearly, there may be prosperity without peace but there is rarely
peace without prosperity. So I guess I need to address some questions to
what I found is an area that-Professor Del Duca looked over at me
because I had asked this yesterday-the inherent problems of reconciling
sometimes Article 12 and 13 about the anti-competitiveness. While the
Union Law has primacy, what we have found in the U.S. is that we have
to have some Union policies that have primacy without the Supremacy
Clause in our economic policies, and that where laws of the Member
States in the guise of being health, welfare, and safety laws actually
prove to have an anti-competitive effect, that the policy of Union
overcomes the shared competency of the state to control the economic
well being. This is a theory that has developed through judicial decisions
and not really through any part of our Constitution. We call it the
Dormant Commerce Clause (for second and third-year law students). It
means that no one has made any laws, but the court itself looks to the
policies of Union for prosperity and says laws in effect become anti-
competitive even though they are not intended to be so. Do you see your
courts dealing with that as a policy in the absence of a primacy or an
economic European Law?
TRIDIMAS: Two points, I think, are relevant here. As I mentioned
earlier, the principle of primacy of Community law is entirely a judge-
made principle. It was established by the European Court of Justice in
Costa v. ENEL in 1964 on the basis of a teleological interpretation of the
Treaty. Also, it is true that, in assessing the compatibility of Member
State laws with Community law, especially whether a national measure
is an obstacle to inter-state trade, the Court focuses on the effects rather
than the objects of the measure. The notion of restriction is "results
driven" and interpreted broadly so as to encompass, in many cases, not
only discriminatory measures but also indistinctly applicable ones, i.e.,
measures which apply both to domestic and imported products or
services.
Allow me here to make a broader constitutional point. The
principle of primacy of Community law has led to a transfer of powers at
three levels. First, there has been a transfer of power from the nation
state to a supranational state, i.e., the European Union.
Secondly, there has been a transfer of power from the executive and
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the legislative to the judiciary. This is because it is possible to challenge
national legislation and administrative measures before the European
Court of Justice and the national courts on grounds of incompatibility
with Community law.
Thirdly, at a more subtle level, there is a shift of power from the
higher national courts to the lower national courts. As a result of the
preliminary reference procedure, a national court has a choice to refer a
question to the European Court of Justice instead of following the case
law of the higher domestic courts.
ZILLER: We have the same three different mechanisms and the
point is that this is a problem the convention has to face. On one side
you have a number of special politicians of members of states or even a
lower level of states who hate this idea. What they want is a clear layer
cake of competence. We lawyers and political scientists know that this
doesn't exist. So, what the Constitution does is to try to make some
things clearer but it does not avoid and certainly we keep all of the
potential of the Dormant Commerce Clause.
The second one is somewhat related. We have in the Constitution
but we had it already in the EC treaty what in a country like Italy or
Spain is called the "Economic Constitution." You see it with the
discussion on the competition rules for instance. One point which is
important to see to relate it again to the starting point. Today we tend to
think that 1957 is trying to impose market theory on Europe. It is partly
true that it is also the idea which is linked again to war. We know what
cartels did to German industry and how it lead, or we think we knew how
it lead partly to the War. There is always this component of let's avoid
going into what lead us to war.
DEL DUCA: Larry, would you like to make some comments for
us?
BACKER: I have what I think is perhaps a very American
comment and I hope you will bear with me. I have noticed much of our
discussions, and virtually all of our discussions about the new European
Constitution and the need for its replacement, tend to focus exclusively
on text. The focus, of course, is in keeping with the civil law tradition of
the primacy of text. It is also in keeping with emerging global traditions
of crafting constitutional text as both a working document and as a
symbol of the highest aspirations in the political community. I don't
mean to suggest that the concentration on text and the implications of the
socio-political choices reflected in the text ought not to be taken
seriously. I would even agree that, to the contrary, close analysis of text
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is necessary and important for any community intent on adopting a new
basic law.
Like both of you, I'm willing to start with the text and I would even
agree that text is central to constitutional discourse. The legislature, the
administrator, and even the citizens (who we don't talk about very much)
really need to be able to rely on something-and that something tends to
be text. And it is common now for societies to employ constitutional text
as the source for the development of a firm and stable grounding of the
social and political order.
However, this is the point where I may begin to diverge a little from
the common understanding. A discourse of constitutionalism that centers
on text ignores the revolutionary and transformative potential of the text
in the hands of what increasingly appears to me to be one of the greatest
institutions for constitutional innovation in Western Europe and U.S.
This institution is the constitutional court. In the hands of a
constitutional court, constitutional text, no matter how definitive it
appeared to be, has proven to be quite fluid. Even those most self
evident provisions of the text, those which when written were meant to
stand the test of time against shifts in understanding and application,
have in time been susceptible to interpretation, and worse, to
reinterpretation.
In most democratic states I understand the principle as firmly
established that the constitutional court must be allocated supreme
authority to interpret constitutional text. This authority has proven
difficult to resist. With it the courts have demonstrated a propensity to
go outside of constitutional text in the service of this interpretation. The
history of the jurisprudence of the European Court of Justice is
particularly telling in this respect, as is that of the U.S. Supreme Court.
This judicial proclivity might suggest that it may be naive to focus
discussion on the text of a constitution, and in so doing ignore the
possibilities for judicial reconstruction of that text. Moreover, and
especially in the case of the European Constitution as currently
constructed, I wonder whether the proposed text itself might serve as a
cover to provide the European Constitutional Court with a greater rather
than a more constrained array of interpretive tools with which to impose
its vision of Europe from its reading of the text and not necessarily the
text of the Constitution itself.
Indeed, when you look at European Constitutionalism, it is clear
that the European Court of Justice certainly has never been dependent on
a blind adherence to textual uniformity or to a uniformly interpreted text
by a political community built on a singular vision of the institutions and
powers of EU. The Court of Justice has, over the last half century,
authoritatively articulated a vision of the European Community through
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the application of a number of jurisprudential interpretive devices, not
the least of which is a development of the jurisprudence of non-textual
general principles of law through which to interpret the treaties.
I don't believe the new constitution will alter the habits of the
European Court of Justice in the use of these jurisprudential devices.
Nor will the new constitution change the Court's role as supreme arbiter
of the scope and nature of community law, and necessarily of whatever
residuary authority is left to the Member States through the application
of these general principles of "constitutional law." Indeed I might argue,
and perhaps the speakers can comment on the suggestion, that the
proposed constitution appears to provide, for the first time, a fairly large
formal nod in this direction through the articulation within the text of the
proposed constitution itself of general principles of interpretation to be
applied by the Institutions of Europe. In this respect at least, the drafters
of the proposed constitution appear to be very clever. The slew of
principles making up the greater portion of the first part of the draft and
including principles of subsidiarity, of cooperation, of federalism, of
separation of powers, of good behavior, is no doubt meant perhaps to
constrain the European Court of Justice. These principles are all meant
to limit the power of European institutions vis a vis the Member States.
But as Americans discovered over the course of several generations,
it is dangerous to try to use the master's tool to dismantle the master's
house. Even if the principle originally intended by someone to have
some limiting effect on the authority of European government, and
especially its Court, the authoritative interpretation of those limitations
will necessarily have to come from the center, and particularly from the
judicial institutions of European government. As in the U.S., I think the
European Constitution is set to vest the institutions of European
government with the authority to determine the limits of its own power
by vesting the European judicial institutions with unlimited power to
make those determinations.
Text, in this case, even European Constitutional text, will provide
little more than the foundation of an analysis. The conclusions to be
drawn from that analysis may not follow in a way supposed nor be self-
evident. More importantly perhaps, this new form of constitutionalism,
this creation and acknowledgment of the European Court of Justice as a
constitutional quasi-national Court may actually expand the
jurisprudential tools available to the ECJ in ways that would have been
unthinkable a year or two ago. These textual tools may make it easier for
the ECJ to deploy non-textual juridicus in order to craft its own vision. I
am thinking particularly of two methods of European constitutional
jurisprudence that might be interesting if applied by the ECJ.
First, I think, comes out of the traditions of Germany and it is a
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tradition that creates hierarchy of constitutional values starting with
general constitutional principles pursuant to which it is possible to view
particular and inferior provisions, black letter provisions of constitutional
text as unconstitutional. These values can be applied to void the
constitutional text itself. This tradition is most famously articulated in
the Southwest Case. 12 And the second, refers to the French proclivity,
certainly since 1971, to expand constitutional value ("valeur
constitutional") to non-constitutional text.13  French tradition now
extends constitutional value to the Preamble of its Constitution and to the
documents incorporated by reference therein.
Imagine a case in which a new European Constitutional court
applied this tradition to give constitutional value to the preface and the
preamble of the European Constitution. Consider the possibilities in that
case, of using French Constitutional values to include within European
Constitutional text to give constitutional value to Thucydides great work
on the Peloponnesian War by the artifice of the quotation of one small
portion of a very large work as part of the preface of the European
Constitution.
An implausible reading, to be sure. But more interesting from the
perspective of the Europeans, would be the use of basic German
constitutional principles, for instance, those now in Part 1 Article 2, to
void specific provisions with respect to the allocation of authority among
the institutions of the EU that are set forth in Part 3. As a result, it may
be useful in any discussion of the European Constitution to talk about
these possibilities as we consider what might well be the textual house of
cards that Europe may be building.
DEL DUCA: Thank You. Well, we have to give equal time to our
guests here. Who wants to go first?
ZILLER: I agree and disagree with what you say. I agree at the
level of legal analysis. The main point of my view is that this
Constitution does not say "we the legal professionals" but "we the
citizens." Certainly, in order to dispense some fears of national
politicians, the constitution is setting a few things like interpretive
principles. I don't think it is to constrain the court. On the contrary, it is
to enhance its legitimacy.
The very clear example is the principle of primacy. We have had it
for forty years. Nobody discusses it amongst lawyers. When the first
12. Southwest Case, I BVerfGE 14 (1951) (Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany).
13. CC decision no. 71-44 DC of 16 July 1971 (Loides Associations).
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draft was made in the Convention, the British representative said we
don't want this, it's just for the show by the way. However, the fact that
we have this has one advantage. If the text is adopted nobody will be
able to say what some politicians still say "this ECJ is doing things that
which it is not permitted." So, I think you are right, but it is not
constraining the court on this.
The second thing-I think the text is very important due to the
specific nature of the EU. What you have in Part 3 is indispensable. We
cannot do European Law without addressing the issue of the legal basis
for the Union. The Court knows it and the Court, also being very
constructive does not go far beyond what is possible. Where there is an
enormous change, I think, it is what Professor Tushnet was discussing,
the court will now have a legal basis for using the Charter without going
through very complicated reasoning like the French do. So I agree and
disagree.
TRIDIMAS: I have three very brief comments. I think that the
Constitution enhances the function of the Court as the Supreme Court of
the Union. I think it enhances it because it brings it closer to the political
game. If you give to the Court jurisdiction to act as a moderator in
disputes between the institutions, in the disputes about the division of
competence, and about subsidiarity, I think the effect of the Constitution
is to make for a stronger court, not for a weaker one.
Secondly, I think the Court itself is going further in assuming the
function of the Supreme Court for the Union. Interestingly, although the
European Community started as an economic organization, what you are
experiencing over the last three or four years is judicial activism in non-
economic spheres-like the sphere of remedies or the sphere of
community citizenship. The European Court derives rights which can be
enforced out of the context of the European citizenship. So the court
itself enhances its function, also an innovation to human rights. This is
an area in which the court has been very active.
Thirdly, I think we are going to find interesting changes in the
composition of the Court. This is because it is going to be a much bigger
one with the accession of the new Member States; and I think we ought
to be honest about the fact that the incoming Member States are quite
different from the existing ones. They are not at the same level of
economic development, nor do they necessarily share traditionally the
same values. This will be perhaps reflected in the way the Court
responds to conflict between economic freedoms for example and issues
for national morality. I think the court is stronger in terms of its
jurisdiction. As to the jurisprudential policy, I think that will be affected
by its composition.
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DEL DUCA: Thank you very much. We must now, because of
time limitations, go to the very important subject of how this constitution
impacts on human rights. We have our distinguished colleague and
friend, Professor Tushnet, to address that subject.
TUSHNET: Thank you. I want to begin by saying that I was
particularly pleased to be asked by Professor Del Duca to participate in
this event, and pleased that we were able to reschedule it after Hurricane
Isabel, because I regarded my participation in this event as a small way
of honoring Professor Del Duca for the work he has done to introduce
people like me to these larger questions of comparative
constitutionalism.
Before describing some of the aspects of protection of fundamental
rights in the new constitution, I want to comment on Professor Backer's
observation. As he was speaking, I noted that he is drawing from a U.S.
tradition where an important component of the kind of judicial behavior
that he is anticipating out of the European court or courts (which is of
course a point I'll make in a moment) arises from the fact that our
Supreme Court is dealing with an old and, for all practical purposes,
unamended Constitution for the past 150 years (taking the reconstruction
amendments as a significant transformation). I think that the interpretive
stance that is likely to occur when you are dealing with a new
constitution is less aggressive (or less ambitious, depending on your
point of view). But, then it occurred to me to go back to something that
Takis Tridimas said. One of the questions that has animated U.S.
discussions of the European process is whether it is possible to create a
constitution where there are no people, where Europe is the way, we in
the U.S imagine it to be. Professor Tridimas said that that may indeed be
a problem, which is why he would like a referendum in each nation to
get the people behind it. But, what is really happening here is essentially
an elite driven process. If that is so, as the elites that sponsor the
constitution withdraw from the field, the elite judicial institutions might
come to replace them as the elite to push the project forward even in the
absence of a "European" people.
On this last point, just a quick note. Earlier this year I saw the film
by a U.S. film maker called "Barcelona." It was set in Barcelona in the
late 1980's or early 1990's. Then I saw a film called "L'Auberge
Espanol," which is set in Barcelona today. "L'Auberge Espanol" can be
understood to be propaganda for the proposition that there is an emerging
European citizenship. But to the extent that it captures anything or that it
gets close to reality, the degree of European citizenship that it depicts is
miles ahead of what we in the U.S. think there is in Europe. Now,
"L'Auberge Espanol" is about people who are in their upper twenties.
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People who are in their 50s and 60s may be different, but the proposition
that there is no European ethos, and that therefore the constitution is
premature (which you tend to hear in the U.S.), is more questionable than
you might think.
Let me say now something about the Charter of Fundamental Rights
in the Constitution. The Charter of Fundamental Rights is a standard list
of modem human rights. It encompasses civil rights, political rights,
equality rights (ideas of equality), and social and economic rights of the
sort that emerged in constitutions after World War II. There is also some
recognition of what are sometimes called third generation rights, that is,
cultural rights and environmental rights. The cultural rights provision
says that the Union shall respect cultural, religious, and linguistic
diversity; the environmental provision says that the union shall guarantee
a high level of environmental protection. It's a comprehensive, modem
list of rights, and its comprehensiveness is what I want to address.
Of course, when you have such a comprehensive list of rights,
everybody knows (that is, people have learned) that you have to include
qualifications of those rights. You can not conceptualize them as
absolute rights, as the U.S. is sometimes criticized for conceptualizing its
rights. The qualifications are interesting. Some of what I have to say
may arise out of translation difficulties but I want to note a couple of
points about the qualifications.
First of all, there is a general qualification provision, which again is
typical of modem constitutions. It is Article 252, which provides:
"Subject to the principle of proportionality limitations may be made only
if they are necessary and genuinely meet objectives of general interest
recognized by the Union or the need to protect the rights and freedoms of
others." The Canadian version, which reads "subject to such limitations
as are demonstrably justifiable in a free and democratic society,"
indicates that the European Constitution's approach is of a piece with
other modem approaches to constitution-drafting.
The comprehensive qualifications to all of the rights previously
granted are recognized elsewhere in the document. I want to note two of
these as typical drafting issues-but they strike me as interesting. When
you recognize social and economic rights, you know that you are going
to have problems if you protect the right to private property. You can't
fully protect private property and simultaneously fully protect social and
economic rights. As a result, the protection of the right to property in
modem constitutions has been intensely controversial. The Canadians
did not include such a right precisely because they were concerned about
the Lochner-era experience in the U.S.
What does the European Constitution say? As to the right to
property, everyone has the right to own, use, dispose, and bequeath his or
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her lawfully acquired property. The use of property may be regulated by
law in so far as is necessary for the general interest. What strikes me as
interesting about that (as a U.S. lawyer and focusing on drafting) is that
this provision contains no proportionality requirement. I can imagine
that that was intentional. That is, it is too easy to characterize social and
economic regulations aimed at promoting social and economic rights as
disproportionate in the extent to which they actually do so. For those of
you familiar with U.S. discussions, consider rent control laws. Their
proponents contend that such laws promote a right to housing. But,
economists will tell you they are, except under very unusual
circumstances, unlikely to do that. So a comprehensive rent control
statute would be disproportionate to the goal of promoting a right to
housing. An interesting question may be whether this is a drafting
oversight, or an intentional recognition of what I have just described as a
sensible argument that drafters might want to worry about.
The other provision I like is also connected to social and economic
rights. This is the provision dealing with the right to collective
bargaining and action. I do not quite understand (again from a lawyer's
perspective) what these are doing. Workers and employers have the right
to negotiate and conclude collective agreements at the appropriate level,
and to take collective action that defend the rights, including strike
action. That is the recognition of the right to collective bargaining and
the right to strike. But, I left out the qualifications: "in accordance with
Union law and National laws and practices." This seems to me to say
that if there is a national law that prohibits a strike under certain
circumstances then the Constitution does not protect the right to strike.
What that means to me, in turn, is that there is no right to collective
bargaining and strikes provided by the European Constitution
independent of the recognition of those rights in national law, which
means, finally, that this provision does not add anything to the
Constitution.
I want to turn now to a broader concern. The interesting question
that will arise inevitably after the adoption of the Constitution is that
there are two judicial institutions in Europe that protect human rights.
One is the European Court of Justice, which is the instrument of the
European Union and its Member States. The other is the European Court
of Human Rights, which implements and enforces the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and has more
members-a larger jurisdiction-than the Constitution will encompass.
But all of the members of the European Union are Member States that
are bound by the European Convention of Human Rights. There has to
be some way to coordinate the European Court of Justice and the
European Constitution, on the one hand, and the European Court of
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Human Rights and the European Convention on the Protection of Human
Rights on the other. The draft of the Constitution tries to do that in the
following way. Article 252(3) provides: "insofar as this charter contains
rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention, the
meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as those laid down
by the Convention."
From my point of view, there are three problems here, two minor
ones and one really serious one. The first minor one is the formulation
which corresponds to rights guaranteed by the convention. Does that
mean "they are exactly the same as," or does it mean "they are sort of
about the same kind of problem as"? If it means exactly the same as,
then there are no coordination problems. The European Court of Justice
will go off on its own and say, "the problem that we are dealing with
here is part of the non-overlap between what the European Constitution
does and the European Convention does." If it means dealing with
roughly the same problem, then you have a coordination issue.
The second minor point is this. To say that the meaning and scope
of the Constitution's provisions shall be the same as the meaning and
scope of the Convention's provisions, is not to say that the meaning and
scope of the Constitution's provisions are the same as the meaning and
scope of those provisions as articulated by the European Court of
Human Rights. There are two views you can have about the meaning
and scope of constitutional provisions. One is that everyone authorized
to interpret the provision is entitled to make an independent judgment of
what the meaning and scope of those provisions are. In that case, the
European Court of Justice could say: "The European Court of Human
Rights says this provision-which we agree is common to both
documents-means 'X,' but they are wrong-it means 'Y.' It means 'Y'
in our provision, and it means 'Y" in their provision. They just got it
wrong when they did it the first time."
The alternative view is that the Europeans Court of Human Rights
interpretation of meaning and scope somehow has to automatically
prevail. In the U.S., in the federalism context, we have solved that
problem-it's the Martin v. Hunter's Lessee problem-and we solved it
by a jurisdictional hierarchy that gives the U.S. Supreme Court the
authority to review and reverse independent judgments made by state
Supreme Courts.
One can imagine a similar jurisdictional arrangement between the
European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights.
The solution that you can imagine here derives from the statement in the
Constitution that the European Union will have a legal personality and
shall seek accession to the European Convention on Human Rights. If I
were negotiating that accession agreement (subject to the next really
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serious problem), I would push to set up a system of review of ECJ
decisions by the European Court of Human Rights with respect to the
Charter of Rights. That is the way of coordinating things.
But, here is the serious problem. The European Convention on
Human Rights is not a comprehensive modem Charter of Rights. It deals
with civil rights, political rights, and equality rights. It has half of what
the Charter has and lacks half of it. You can imagine the following
occurring. The European Union enacts legislation that is challenged as a
violation of a Charter political right (e.g., that it violates freedom of
expression). The legislation is defended in court on the ground that
while in some sense it might violate freedom of expression, it advances
some social and economic rights. This kind of problem has arisen in
connection with equality provisions and affirmative action. The general
experience is that at "time one" you enact a general equality provision
like our equal protection clause. At "time two" the legislature enacts an
affirmative action program. At "time three" the Constitutional Court
says affirmative action is inconsistent with the general equality
provision. This scenario played out in India and in the U.S. There's not
a lot of experience with it but those are two pretty good examples.
What constitution drafters have learned is what the drafters of the
Convention have learned. You have to put in a provision that says the
equality provision does not invalidate affirmative action. They did that
with respect to equality and affirmative action for women in the
European Constitution. They did not do it, and I don't think it could be
done with respect to the whole range of protecting cultural diversity,
social and economic rights, etc. The difficulty is that when you try to
coordinate the ECJ and its implementation of the broad range of Charter
Rights with the European Convention on Human Rights, which protects
a narrower range, it's going to be a mess. I can imagine the European
Court of Human Rights thinking its way out of the problem, but it's not
an easy problem to get out of and it's going to be interesting to see what
happens.
I think I will leave it at that. Because of the differences in age of
the European Convention on Human Rights and the European
Constitution, this problem is going to arise and it is going to take some
ingenuity to preserve the Constitution's vision of human rights-that is,
the modem vision of human rights-against the less-comprehensive
vision embodied in the European Convention.
DEL DUCA: I would like to invite the panelists comment at this
point and then we'll take a few minutes to answer questions from the
audience. Does anybody have any comments?
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KELLETT: No, I think it would be good to let those who have
listened so carefully ask some questions.
DEL DUCA: Alright, I agree.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: (unintelligible)
ZILLER: I will try and respond shortly. The first thing is that's
because I am a French administrative lawyer. I totally reject the idea that
the civil against common law perspective would be irrelevant here.
What seems to be typically common law attitude of the ECJ is what we
have with the French Concilidat but that is another story.
What is more important I think that you have put your finger on two
essential failures of the Convention. Not the Convention on Human
Rights, but the Convention which drafted this constitution. They did not
look at the exemptions Britain and Denmark have which are not
consistent with this. They could not because if they have started this, I
guess everybody would have said every national government would say
"just go on talking, we are not interested in what you are producing."
Political realism avoided looking at this. What I mean with this is that
the extraordinary thing is that due to several clauses on enhanced
cooperation, etc., what this constitution does is to say we made a mistake
in Maastricht and further down the road by providing exemptions to
countries. We made a mistake by providing exemptions to Britain and to
Denmark and an exemption to Ireland. We will not do it again.
This is totally implicit for new countries for "acquis communitaire"
is everything. In a sense, you can read this through Article 59, and I
think that is the good thing. It is saying well, you like or you don't like
it. If you like it, you join, if you dislike it, you get out. Practically
speaking obviously, I wonder if any country will ever leave but it is
putting the weight of what is membership in another way. What is
missing is an explicit clause about "acquis communitaire" for joining.
Certainly, what is missing is a clause about not having exemptions and
what is missing more, but how could you have it, politically speaking,
would be a kind of sunset clause saying those exemptions should
disappear within a definite time limit. This is missing because it was not
politically feasible to have it.
The other thing which the Convention did not look at is something
that we don't have only treaties, we have an enormous amount of
protocols which are regulating a lot of things and which have the same
legal level as the Constitution itself and that is where the ICJ might look
at it. There are things which are terribly complicated in the Constitution.
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DEL DUCA: Thank you. There are some lovely refreshments
waiting for us and we use a technique of providing sidebar conferences
while the refreshments are being served in order to ask questions that
should have been addressed but which time limitations did not permit to
be addressed. Before I make this statement, I had one person who said
may I make a comment, and since he comes to us from across the
Atlantic. Takis, you may make your comments.
TRIDIMAS: Thank you very much. I didn't mean to keep you, just
a very brief response to the question asked. I endorse everything that
Professor Ziller said with the accession of the Member States. The
reason why there were not a lot of doubts is simply because they did not
have any negotiating power to enforce. However, there is a lot of
compromise in the acquis communitaire. There are multiple examples of
permanent derogation for the treaty, no other state ever has got a
permanent derogation and this is in the acquisition of secondary
residences. Because Malta is such a small place there was a fear that the
whole of Malta would be bought up by British German tourists who go
there in the summer. That is why they successfully negotiated a
permanent [unintelligible].
Now, what they found in the state in the negotiations of the
accession is this, that there was a lot of hard bargaining and the new
Member States found that they couldn't get anywhere because the fifteen
existing states would not accept their suggestions. They thought of
another technique which is to ask the presidency to include declaration.
Now there's a difference between protocol and declaration. The protocol
has the same clause as the treaty itself. A declaration can be included
after the signature and strictly speaking does not have legal force.
The practice that developed after we agreed on everything,
negotiators from the new Member States would come up and say,
according to the declarations and of course, by reading these
declarations, I found out that they were not declarations at all. They
were reservations. They were undoing commitments under the treaty.
To start with, we accepted some of them and of course, once these were
presented to the committee drafting accession, then I would have the
general delegation come in and say, can we include a counter declaration
to the declaration. There were a series of declarations and counter
declarations that I thought were going to be completely unwelcome.
What appears is this, one single counter declaration from the existing
Member States which goes at the very end. There are the declarations of
the acceding states who disagree with some issues and then you will find
(I think it is declaration 26) it comes from the existing Member States
and says very simply "we think that the previous declaration do not
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affect any of the provisions of this treaty." It is a kind of "chapeau"
counter declaration saying the new Member States say what we think
when in fact that does not change the obligations under the treaty. That
was an interesting change which I think is related to your question.
Thank you very much.
SYMPOSIUM ON A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR EUROPE
I. ADDENDUM - July 6, 2004
After the agreement reached on 18 June 2004 by the Heads of States
and Governments in the Brussels European Council meeting, the Treaty
establishing a Constitution for Europe needs only to be signed (probably
in early Autumn) by the representatives of the twenty-five Member
States, prior to submission to Member States for ratification. Some time
is still needed to establish the final consolidated text in twenty-one
languages, but generally speaking, the entire text is now available in a
final wording in French 14 and will shortly be available in English.
An overview of major changes to the text adopted by the European
Convention one year ago follows.
LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL
The idea of a specific Legislative Council of Ministers has been
abandoned. (art. 1-23). The relevant provision now provides:
The Council shall meet in public when it deliberates and votes on a
draft legislative act. To this end, each Council meeting shall be divided
into two parts, dealing respectively with deliberations on Union
legislative acts and non-legislative activities,
A major element is maintained by retention of the distinction
between public meetings for legislative acts and nonpublic meetings for
other Council activities. The Convention however had envisioned a
specific Legislative Council composed of up to three Ministers of each
government (without affecting the number of votes for each country),
thus allowing for the Council to be identified as a kind of upper-house in
the legislative process.
EUROPEAN COMMISSION
The final number of members of the European Commission will be
equal to two thirds of the Member States, after a transition period which
will last until 2014 (with one Commissioner for each Member State in
the interim). (art. 1-25). There will be no Commissioners without voting
rights.
The system proposed by the Convention was for 15 full
Commissioners, whatever the number of Member States would be.
14 Available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/2004/jun/constitution-
amendments-june22.pdf
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These 15 would be matched by a number of Commissioners without
voting rights in order to come to a total equal to the number of Member
States.
None of these systems is fully satisfactory. They suggest that
Commissioners are some kind of representatives of Member States (like
members of the Parliament or members of the Council). Commissioners
actually are supposed to represent only the Union's interests. In
addition, eighteen members seem too many to develop a solid team spirit
and collegial decisions to which each Commissioner contributes in an
equal manner. However the text adopted by the IGC allows for the
European Council to change the eighteen-member requirement by a
unanimity vote. This provision was probably introduced to reassure
governments who want each member state to be represented in the
Commission. It might on the contrary be used in order to adjust the
number of Commissioners downward to facilitate creation of an efficient
team and facilitate collegial decision-making.
COUNCIL QUALIFIED MAJORITY
The qualified majority in the Council will consist of 55% of
Member States (with a minimum of fifteen states) representing 65%
percent of the population of the Union. (art. 1-24). This is in lieu of the
convention proposal for a majority (50% + 1) of member states
representing three fifths (60%) of the population. This was the provision
on which most of the debates focused. Spain and Poland had declared
during the Italian presidency of the Union (second part of 2003) that they
wanted to retain the position they had acquired with the Treaty of Nice.
That treaty gave them twenty-seven votes, as opposed to twenty-nine for
France, Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom. It therefore gave them
a weight far greater than their relative population. Spain and Poland
each have about 40 million inhabitants, while Germany has 80 million
and the three other "big" countries have about 60 million each. The
Netherlands, with 15 million inhabitants only has thirteen votes under the
Nice system.
The IGC solution has kept the main two advantages of the "double
majority" system. However compared to the present one it is more
simple, and more equitable. A blocking minority will need to consist of
at least four Member States, which should avoid a coalition that is not
representative enough to block decisions of the Council.
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MINIMUM NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT FOR A
MEMBER STATE
The minimum number of Members of Parliament for one Member
State will be six, regardless of the size of its population. (art. 1-19). The
Convention proposed a minimum of four. This means that very small
Member States, like Luxembourg and Malta, who have less than a half a
million inhabitants, will have a relative over-representation. This is to
compensate for the disadvantage incurred by small states in utilizing
population in the qualified majority voting system of the Council.
UNANIMITY
In a few cases where the Convention foresaw qualified majority
voting, unanimity has been maintained (e.g. in taxation). Overall the
Constitution has increased the number of fields where decisions are made
by qualified majority voting. Some important fields (foreign affairs,
taxation, social regulations) remain under the unanimity rule and a single
Member State may thus oppose any innovation in those fields.
NEW PROVISIONS
The IGC has included some new provisions in the Constitutions. A
new provision of particular interest is Article III-2a that stresses the
importance of social policy aims and elevates them to a pervasive EU
parameter underpinning the whole spectrum of EU activities. It states
that, in defining and implementing its policies and actions, the Union:
... shall take into account requirements linked to the promotion of a
high level of employment, the guarantee of adequate social protection,
the fight against social exclusion, and a high level of education, training
and protection of human health.
This provision does not as such give any new competence to the
Union but mandates the EU institutions to take account not only of
economic considerations but also social policy objectives in making
policy choices.
Further, Article 1-16 of the Constitution adds tourism as an area
where the Union has recognized competence to carry out supporting,
coordinating and complementary action.
2004]
PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW
AMENDMENT PROCEDURES
The IGC has made it more difficult for the European Council to
amend the voting procedures of the Council of Ministers. Article 1-24(4)
of the draft Constitution as adopted by the European Convention in July
2003 enabled the European Council to change the decision-making
procedures of the Council of Ministers. It provided, in particular, that
the European Council could decide in the future on its own initiative and
by unanimity that the Council of Ministers could adopt legislation by
qualified majority in an area where the draft Constitution required
unanimity. The only procedural condition imposed was that the
European Council was under an obligation to send to national
Parliaments any such proposed change no less than four months before
any decision was taken. The IGC has limited the power of the European
Council to decide a chance from unanimity to qualified majority in two
ways. New Article IV-7a(1) states that such a change cannot take place
in relation to decisions with military implications or those in the area of
defense. Also, under Article IV-7a(2), a national parliament has the
power to veto any change from unanimity to qualified majority taken by
the European Council.
The IGC, however, has provided for a simplified procedure for
amending the provisions of Title III of Part III of the Constitution that
define the powers of the Union in the field of internal policies (i.e.
internal market, environment etc, the area of freedom, security and
justice, and the areas where the Union may take coordinating action).
Under Article IV-7b, an amendment to those parts of the Constitution
does not require the setting up of a convention and an IGC (which is the
ordinary procedure for amendment of the Constitution under Article IV-
7) but may be made by the European Council acting unanimously after
consulting the European Parliament and the Commission. This
simplified amendment procedure is subject to two limitations: Any
amendment made therefrom may not increase the competences conferred
on the Union by the Constitution; and it cannot come into force until it
has been approved by the Member States in accordance with their
respective constitutional requirements.
OTHER CHANGES
These are only the highlights of the changes to the Convention's
draft. The rest consists mainly of changes in wording ("Council" instead
of "Council of Ministers") or specific changes in procedures in some
policy fields (like that which applies when a Member State has a deficit
which is too high). These changes are not unimportant, but they do not
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change the overall architecture or balance of the Convention's draft.

